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Abstract
The reward functions are essential ingredients of consensus mechanism in Block-
chain, which may bias the wealth distributions due to various incentives. Gen-
erally, constant reward function in proof of stakes (PoS) may incur the phe-
nomenon of compounding, where rich get richer. That is, the wealth distribu-
tion is not so equitable in proof of stakes than that in proof of works (PoW).
In the sequel, geometric reward function is proposed as an alternative choice to
circumvent this problem. However, it’s not so desirable since no parties have
incentives to participate in the consensus mechanism, which does not capture
the concern of incentive compatability. In this paper, we tailor a new bonus
reward function by adding random salts to the geometric reward function. The
new reward function is a tradeoff between equitablity and incentive compati-
bility. We conclude that the quitability of the new reward function is optimal
compared with others. Beyond that, we present Gini coefficients to fine-evaluate
euqitability of reward functions. We propose a new metric (aka. reward ratio) to
quantify the level of incentive compability. Our simulation results show that the
new reward function performs better than others in both incentive compatibility
and anti-compounding.
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Cryptocurrency, represented by bitcoin, has the conspicuous virtue of “de-
centralization”, which transforms the manners of value transmission and wealth
distribution in cyber space. Recently blockchain, the underlining technology of
bitcoin, has been broadly discussed and applied in various fields, such as finance,5
healthcare, Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud computing [? ? ]. As is well
known, the basic regime in blockchain is consensus mechanism, which may keep
in functional order if all participants have enough incentives [? ]. Otherwise,
the blockchain system is going to be on the verge of collapse. Generally, econ-
omy measures (i.e. reward function) are taken to provide incentives sustaining10
the stability of blockchain system. Constant reward function, where the reward
function is constant in a certain period, is widely used in many consensus mech-
anisms due to easy implementation. However, the usage of constant reward
function may cause compounding of wealth (i.e. equitability) in PoS. Geomet-
ric reward function, where the reward function dynamically changes according15
to some fixed parameters, may dwarf the phenomenon of wealth compounding.
While it’s proved to be not incentive compatible, which impedes the awareness of
taking part in consensus mechanism. In effect, any perfect looking reward func-
tions are of limited value to both practice and research if wealth compounding
and incentives absence cannot be settled. There should be a tradeoff between20
equitability and incentive compatibility.
Therefore, we propose a new reward function based on geometric reward
function by introducing random bonus mechanism. More concretely, each par-
ticipant who has the privilege to create a new block may get extra bonus except
for his rewards. We meticulously design positive bonus to assign enough incen-25
tives at the beginning of system so that participants are willing to take part
into the consensus mechanism. Note that the expectation of the whole bonus
is zero. That means there exist some negative bonus, which will not impede
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the incentives since the rewards derived from reward function are large enough
to neutralize the negative bonus. Our new reward function performs well in30
both world restraining the compounding phenomenon and guaranteeing incen-
tive compatibility to acceptable extents.
1.1. Related works
On the contrary to “ASIC-resistance” coins, which seem more “egalitrian”,
PoS is easy to make rich richer. Some empirical analyses indicate that PoS35
system has poor equitability [? ]. However, there is a lack of formal discussion
with respect to equitability issue. Azouvi et al. define the notion of egalitar-
ianism to measure the equitability of most popular cryptocurrencies including
Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin and Monero [? ]. Their simulation results show
that “ASIC-resistance” performs well in decreasing egalitarianism. As an unex-40
pected outcome, the stake-based cryptocurrencies can be perfectly egalitarian
by elaborately selected parameters. Fanti et al. quantify the phenomenon of
compounding by a new metric named equitability [? ]. They claim that the
equitability of existing reward functions used in PoW and PoS is not acceptable
and therefore they propose a geometric rewards function. They prove that the45
new reward function performs better in equitability and may resist selfish mining
attacks. The downside is that geometric reward function guarantee little incen-
tives for parties at the beginning of the system. Leonardos et al. implement
Oceanic games in blockchain mining, which is normally used to analyze decision
making in corporate settings [? ]. They also reveal incentives to form mining50
pools in order to increase their resources. At the last part of their paper, they
declare that their strategic interactions can be directly applied in blockchain
equitability.
The work of [? ] neglects an important ingredient in blockchain economic
ecosystem–incentives. As we mentioned above, parties should have enough in-55
centives to sustain the consensus mechanism. Brünjes et al. [? ] address
the problem of stake formation without mention of compounding. Solidus is
an incentive compatible cryptocurrency on the basis of permissionless Byzan-
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tine consensus [? ]. It injects incentives for almost each phase of the practical
Byzantine consensus like get-epoch phase, elect phase, prepare phase and ac-60
cept phase. The incentives also consist of negative ones such as penalties for
malicious actions. On the other hand, Solidus can also mitigate selfish min-
ing attacks. Ouroboros also considers incentives by rewarding nodes, who are
members of a committee generating a new block [? ]. FruitChains is a new
blockchain protocol, which introduce a notion of fairness [? ]. It manages to65
reach optimal fairness level under the scenario of selfish mining attack since it
undermines incentive compatibility [? ]. They prove that, given proper pa-
rameters, δ- approximate fairness can be reached. Both [? ] and [? ] are
incentive compatibility for block proposers. However, they fail to eliminate the
variance of rewards. Luu et al. demystify incentives in blockchain toward the70
view of game theory [? ]. They formalize the attacks as verifier’s dilemma game
and propose a solution for this game. Their formalization is practical since it’s
implemented in real cryptocurrency networks [? ? ].
The last problem is how to evaluate equitability and incentive compatibility.
The existing works propose lots of solutions as mentioned above. In effect, Gini75
coefficient is a mature metric to measure inequality in economics [? ] and
blockchain is really an economic ecosystem [? ? ? ]. Therefore, it’s natural to
evaluate the wealth (i.e. stakes) distribution by Gini coefficient [? ? ? ]. Kondor
et al. analyze the bitcoin transaction network toward the view of complex
network by measuring degree distribution, degree correlations and clustering80
coefficient [? ]. They also study the money flow in the network and the wealth
accumulation with Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is approximate 0.985,
which means a high inequality in wealth for the transaction network. Maesa
et al. [? ] construct a users graph instead of transaction network in the work
of [? ]. They define three properties of richness for the network and evaluate85
them with Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient of the mining power is studied
in [? ], which utilizes practical bitcoin data between 2013-12-21 and 2018-12-19.
Another case study of the wealth distribution with respect to bitcoin network is
conducted in [? ]. It collects more than 36 million transactions and a list of all
4
users including their wealth. The authors prove that rich have becoming richer90
since the Gini coefficient is very close to 1. Again, the egalitarianism of bitcoin
peer-to-peer network is mentioned in [? ], where Gini coefficient is analyzed
with network degree distribution.
1.2. Motivations and contributions
As can be seen in existing works, equitability is an essential feature. Gini95
coefficient is one of metrics to evaluate the equitability for Blockchain-based
systems. Previous empirical works demonstrate that Gini coefficient is pretty
high in bitcoin networks, which may be inclined to centralization, contrary to
the original intention of blockchain. For example, rich may get richer. Note that
the stake accumulation is closely related to the definition of reward function.100
Another problem, worthy of being paid attention to, but easily being ignored, is
incentive mechanism. Any reward function, even with low Gini coefficient (high
equitability), is an empty promise if parties has no incentives to be involved in
the blockchain system. However, the existing works are less than satisfactory
in both equitability and incentive mechanism. Therefore, a new bonus reward105
function based on geometrical reward function is proposed to make a tradeoff
between equitablity and incentive compatibility. Our main contribution are as
follows.
• We revisit the geometric reward function rg in [? ] and find that it is
not incentive compatibility especially at the outset of blockchain system.110
Therefore, we propose a metric (aka. reward ratio), which is defined as the
ratio between the initial and the ith block reward with respect to specific
reward function r. The ratio of geometric reward function is far below
that of constant reward function rc. However, the latter has undesirable
equitability.115
• We propose a new bonus reward function rb as a trade off between incentive
compatibility and equitability. We prove, given proper parameters, it
suffices that the bonus reward function is optimal reward ratio compared
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Table 1: The comparison on incentive compatibility and equitability (X denotes desirable
property and × on the contrary)
Reward function Incentive compatibility Equitability
Constant reward X ×
Geometric reward × X
Bonus reward X X
with the geometric reward function. Table ?? presents the comparison
with respect to incentive compatibility and equitability.120
• We analyze the compounding of wealth in PoS with gini coefficient instead
of equitability since the former is the most commonly used measurement
of inequality in economics. We simulate the Gini coefficients for constant
reward function, geometric reward function and bonus reward function
respectively. To visually demonstrate the differences of Gini coefficients125
of these reward function, we simulate them with respect to various distri-
butions (e.g. Pareto distribution, Weibul distribution). The results show
that the wealth distribution is acceptable under proper parameters.
1.3. Road map
Some preliminaries are present in section 2, consisting of Gini coefficient,130
various distributions and incentive compatibility etc. Section 3 first delineates
the definitions of constant reward function and geometric reward function, then
proposes the new bonus reward function based on geometric reward function.
We revisit the evaluation of equitability used in [? ] and compare this metric of
bonus reward function with others. It’s proved that, given proper parameters,135
bonus reward function is most equitable among these reward function. Finally,
we propose a new concept (aka. reward ratio) to evaluate the metric of incentive
compatability and prove that bonus reward function is optimal with respect to
reward ratio. Section 4 presents the pseudo codes of simulation programs and
compare reward function, geometric reward function and bonus reward function140
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under various fixed parameters. The simulation results show that bonus reward
function performs well in both equitability and incentive compatibility, which
is consistent with the theoretical analysis.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Gini coefficient145
Generally, Gini coefficient is an index usually adopted to measure the degree
of inequality in a distribution. Gini coefficient is widely used in economics
to evaluate how equality of income distributions. Therefore, we borrow this
convention to analyze the equality for wealth distributions of crptocurrencies
under the influences of specific reward functions. Normally, Gini coefficient is
defined based on Lorenz curve. An alternative but equivalent definition for Gini
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Here, xi is the income of party i (i ∈ [1, 2, ..., n]) and x is the average absolute
difference of all pairs of items for all parties.
2.2. Related distributions
Pareto distributions. The Pareto distribution, is a power-law probability
distribution found in a large number of real-world phenomena. Its most sig-150
nificant representativeness rule is “Pareto principle” (or, the 80-20 rule), which
means that about 80% of the wealth is held by 20% of its population. There-
fore, it’s natural to assume that the wealth distribution for cryptocurrencies is
Pareto distribution at least in the initial stage of the wealth. The probability






0 x < xm.
(2)
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Here X is a random variable with Pareto distribution, x is a specific number,
xm is the minimum possible value of X, and α is a positive parameter.
Weibull distributions. Weibul distribution is a continuous probability dis-
tribution, which is widely used in the reliability engineering processing life test
data. Here, we use the distribution to denote the life-span of cryptocurrencies.160











0 x < 0.
(3)
Here k > 0 denotes the shape parameter and λ > 0 denotes the scale parame-
ter of the distribution. Both are parametric families of probability distributions.
Exponential distribution. Exponential distributions describe that events
occur independently in a mean speed. It’s used to sample random values for165
our proposed reward functions since it is memoryless. The probability density
function of an exponential distribution is as follows.
f(x; γ) =
 γe
−γx x ≥ 0,
0 x < 0.
(4)
Here x denotes the fixed time and γ denotes the number of events occurrence
in unit time.
2.3. Incentive compatibility170
Incentive compatibility is a mechanism, where parties may achieve optimal
incomes when they act according to their true preferences. Here the true pref-
erences may denote the decided principles in cryptocurrency ecosystems. The
basic idea for removing the phenomenon of compounding is the reward therein
due to incentives for parties. Therefore, the reward function must be incentive175
compatible. Otherwise, the reward function is of no use, no matter how perfect
it is.
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3. Reward function and equitability
3.1. Reward functions
Reward function is an essential part in cryptocurrencies since it provides180
incentives for parties to act by following the specific consensus mechanisms (e.g.
PoW, PoS). The reward functions should first satisfy the property of incentive
compatibility and then equitability. In this paper, we still adopt the reward
functions as previous works, where the total reward coins is fixed to be about 21
million. Parties (aka. miners) manage to mine a block and win a specific reward185
for mining the block. The reward is halved every 210,000 blocks in the Nakamoto
consensus mechanism, which is also the commonly used reward function in most
consensus mechanism. However, this kind of constant reward function may lead
to the phenomenon of compounding when it’s implemented in proof of stake.
Geometric reward function [? ] is lack of incentives especially at the first few190
blocks even if it can cripple compounding to some extent. Therefore, we propose
a new bonus reward function, which makes a trad off between compounding and
incentives. Here, we inherit the notations in [? ] to facilitate the illustration





denote the total rewards. Similar to [? ], R and T are fixed as above.195
• Constant reward function rc(t) = RT (rc for simplicity), where t = [1, 2, 3, ......]
the tth block.
• Geometric reward function rg(t) = (1+R)
t
T −(1+R) t−1T (rg for simplicity).
• Bonus reward function rb(t) = (1+R)
t
T −(1+R) t−1T +ct (rb for simplicity),
where ct obeys exponential distribution with 0 expectation. The main role200
for ct is to add random slats to the reward function such that a trad off
between equitability and incentive compatibility can be made.
The reward functions are shown in Figure ??. The constant reward function
and the geometric reward function are the same to the work of [? ]. The bonus
reward function is a composition of geometric reward function and random cost205
9
as shown in Figure ??. Here the block height is divided into 5 periods, each of
which consists of 210,000 blocks. For example, the first period denotes 0-210,000
blocks and the the second period denotes 210,001-420,000 and so on.


















Figure 1: The constant, geometric and bonus reward functions. Here constant denotes the
constant reward function, geometric denotes the geometric reward function, cost denotes the
random salts used in bonus reward function and geocost denotes bonous reward function.
3.2. Evaluation of equitability
The notion of equitability is define identically to [? ]. Here, we only present210
the equitability of our bonus reward function and prove that, given proper
parameters, the equitability of bonus reward function is optimal than geometric
reward function.
Theorem 1 Given ci >
Si
Si−1
ci−1 (i = 1, 2, ...T ), the bonus reward function
rb is the most equitable among the constant reward function, geometric reward215
function and the bonus reward function.
Proof: Since it’s proved that the equitability of geometric reward function
rg is better than that of the constant reward function rc. So we only prove that
the equitability of bonus reward function rb is optimal compared with that of
the geometric reward function rg. The conclusion can be established.220
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Let S(n) = rg = (1 +R)
n
T − (1 +R)n−1T , S′(n) = rb = rg + ci. According to
Lemma 1 in [? ], we have,





(2eθn − 1). (5)









r′(n) = S′(n+ 1)− S′(n) = S(n+ 1)− S(n) + (cn+1 − cn). (7)
The equitability of rb is in Equation ?? when we combine Equations ?? and ??
into Equation ??.





(2e′θn − 1) (8)
Let cT = 0, the difference between Equation ?? and ?? is the part of∏T
i=1(2e
θn − 1). Therefore, we only need to compare this part. Let,
Erg = E
1
g ∗ E2g ∗ .....ETg = (
2S0
S1
− 1) ∗ (2S1
S2













Here, we relax the condition by only comparing each pair of Eig and E
i
p
(i = 1, 2, ...T ) independently. So we have,
Eig − Eip = (
2(Si + ci)
Si−1 + ci−1









In conclusion, given ci >
Si
Si−1




p and thus V ar(vA,rb(T )) <225




Incentive compatibility is another metric for cryptocurrencies except for eq-
uitability. Sometimes, it’s especially important compared with equitability since230
any reward function is good for nothing with no incentives. Therefore, in this
paper, we introduce the incentive compatibility to illustrate the incentives such
that parties are willing to take part into the consensus mechanism. In the fol-
lowing, we present the definition for evaluating the performance of incentive
compatibility within crytocurrency content.235




rx = rx(tinvi1)/rx(tj)) (9)
Here, x denotes different reward functions, invi denotes the ith interval. tj
denotes the (tj)
th block, which suffices that d tjT e = inv
i and tinvi1 (tinv for
simplicity) denotes the first block inside the ith interval.
Definition 2 The reward ratio for reward function rx is optimal compared












, The bonus reward function rb is
optimal reward ratio compared with the geometric reward function.
Proof Scheme: It’s obvious that ratinv
i
rc = 1, rat
invi


















suffices. Note that the designer for the245
consensus mechanism can arbitrarily choose the parameters.

4. Simulations and comparisons
In this section, we simulate the Gini coefficients for three reward functions
mentioned above. In fact, the wealth distribution is affected not only by the250
reward function but also by the consensus mechanism. Therefore, we simulate
Gini coefficients based on the reward function and consensus mechanism (e.g.
PoS and PoW). More concretely, (1) each party is assumed to own some initial
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stakes, which are sampled by specific distributions like Pareto distribution and
Weibull distribution. Meanwhile, the computational power is also initialed ac-255
cording to the same distributions if PoW is used. (2) The algorithm decides the
winner for the current block according to their ratio of stakes or computational
power. (3) The algorithm updates the stakes and enters into the next block. (4)
Gini coefficient is computed according to Equation ??. The algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 1.260
We present the Gini coefficient of constant reward function under PoW con-
sensus mechanism in Figure ??. There are some subtle differences in Gini coeffi-
cient (close to 1) when the distribution parameter is lower than 1. Note that the
distributions are normalized to fall into [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In fact, the parameters
are magnified 100 times in Algorithm 1. The Gini coefficient decrease dramati-265
cally when the initial stakes are sampled according to Pareto distribution. On
the other hand, the Gini coefficients keep the trend with the distribution param-
eters grow when the initial stakes are sampled according to random and Weibull
distributions. In other words, the initial samplings affect the wealth distribution
under PoW consensus mechanism and Pareto distribution facilitate to impair270
the compounding phenomenon compared with the other two distributions.
In the sequel, we demonstrate the Gini coefficients of different reward func-
tions under PoS consensus mechanism in Figures ??, ??, ?? respectively. Fur-
thermore, we also present Gini coefficients with different initial stake distribu-
tions since they affect the wealth distributions as mentioned above. Note that275
the general trends of Gini coefficients for PoS are similar to that of PoW except
that the Gini coefficients are relatively low under PoS consensus mechanism.
That is, PoS performs better that PoW with respect to wealth distribution,
which is a little bit contradict to the existing result with equitability in [? ].
Therefore, Gini coefficient is a better metric to measure the wealth distribution280
compared to equitability. As can be seen in Figures ??, ?? ??, the Gini coeffi-
cients tend to be stable. Take the coefficients under Pareto distribution as an
example, the Gini coefficients of geometric and bonus-random reward functions
are close to 0, which denote absolutely fair within the scope of wealth distribu-
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Algorithm 1 Gini Coefficient
1: function Gini(Wealths[ ])
2: len← Length(Wealths[ ])
3: Sorted Wealths[ ]← Sort(Wealths[ ])
4: for i = 1→ len do
5: Sum Wealths[i]← Sorted Wealths[i] + Sum Wealths[i− 1]
6: end for
7: Last Wealth← Sum Wealths[len− 1]

















16: while Gini Coefficient ≥ ξ do
17: R← Gen BTC(self, ∗args)
18: Reword[ ]← Calculate block reward
19: for i = 1→ Length(R) do
20: if POW model then
21: C ← Gen POW (self, ∗args)
22: end if
23: if POW model then
24: k ← Selection(C[ ])
25: else
26: k ← Selection(R[ ])
27: end if
28: R[k]← R[k] +Reward[t]
29: end for
30: Gini Coefficient← Gini(R)
31: end while
32: end function 14
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Figure 2: The Gini coefficient of constant reward function under PoW consensus mechanism.
Here α, γ and β are distribution parameters in Pareto distribution, Weibull distribution and
random distribution respectively.
tion. That is, geometric reward function and bonus-random geometric reward285
function perform better than constant reward function.
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Figure 3: The Gini coefficient of constant reward function under PoS consensus mechanism.
Finally, we compare the Gini coefficients of three rewards functions with
identical initial stake distributions in Figure ?? and ?? respectively. Similar to
previous results, the Gini coefficients have little difference when the distribution
15
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Figure 4: The Gini coefficient of geometric reward function under PoS consensus mechanism.
Bonus Reward POS and Gini
Figure 5: The Gini coefficient of bonus reward function under PoS consensus mechanism.
16
parameters are lower than 1 and fork afterwards. However, it’s obvious that290
the Gini coefficients of bonus reward function is minimum among three reward
functions. That is, our proposed reward function performs best with respect to
the wealth distribution, which coincides with the theoretical analysis.
POS Bonus
Figure 6: The Gini coefficient of reward functions under Pareto distribution.
POS Bonus
Figure 7: The Gini coefficient of reward functions under Weibull distribution.
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5. Conclusions and future works
Recently, there’s a great concern over cryptocurrencies, which may overturn295
the value transformation model. The wealth is reallocated in cryptocurrency
economic environment according to the consensus mechanism. More specifically,
certain incentive mechanism is implemented to inspire miners by rewarding them
to mine new blocks. One of the highlights therein is the wealth distribution
under the reward functions. Bonus reward function is proposed based on geo-300
metric reward function by adding random salts. We prove that bonus reward
function is the most equitable function compared with constant and geometric
reward functions. Furthermore, equitability is not the unique metric to evalu-
ate the fairness of wealth distributions. We borrow Gini coefficient as a metric
to evaluate the wealth distribution over cryptocurrencies. The simulation re-305
sults show that bonus reward function has a lower Gini coefficient, which can
cripple compounding to some extend. The future works should consider other
reward functions except for the proposed ones to leverage the incentives and
equitability.
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